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Footnotes 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. Kateri Walsh, Oregon State Bar Ass’n, quoted in, Courts’ Cash
Crunch, April 2003 ABA JOURNAL at 17 (April 2003).
3. Jason White, Govs Scramble for Soundbites to Decry Budget Crisis—
Red-Ink Blues, Montana Associated Technology Roundtables, avail-
able at http://www.matr.net/article-6290.html (last visited October
4, 2004).    
4. The Oregon judiciary was arguably the most seriously affected and
was required to furlough employees and implement a delay and no
action plan for several case types.  The Missouri judiciary lost
upward of 60% of its judicial education budget and 54% of its gen-
eral revenue funding for court technologies.  
5. In Pennington County v. South Dakota Unified Judicial System, 641
N.W.2d 127 (S.D., 2002), the county sued the state arguing that a
state law mandating that counties provide free space to the “court”
did not extend to related programs such as the court’s probation
office.  The county sought to relocate that office and charge the
state rent in an effort to recoup some of the costs associated with
providing state courts space in county courthouses.  The county
lost on appeal with the state supreme court determining that where
the state commands a county to provide space for a court and its
operations, the county, as a political subdivision of the state, can-
not contest that command in a suit against the state.   Although
this case did not arise in the context of cost shifting in reaction to
the fiscal crisis, it does portray the ever-present tension that now
exists between local and state funding obligations for the courts.
It has been described as the worst state fiscal crisis since theend of World War II, with officials from across the countrylikening it to a “perfect storm,” “the Incredible Hulk of bud-
get deficits,” and a “problem of historic proportions.”3
Beginning in 2001, almost every state experienced a deep fiscal
crisis that placed funding of critical services in jeopardy and ren-
dered many previously hallowed programs subject to draconian
cuts, if not outright elimination. The fiscal crisis was particularly
traumatic for court systems receiving all or a significant portion
of their funding directly from state governments.  
In response to the fiscal crisis, courts curtailed operating
hours, laid off employees, closed courthouses, eliminated
funding for education programs, curtailed technology develop-
ment, and abolished what were once thought to be inviolate,
even sacrosanct programs.4 In some cases, state courts turned
to local governments—who were facing their own budgetary
problems5—in an effort to “backfill” the reduction in state
funds.  In recent years, as state governments have replaced tra-
ditional local funding with state funding, the fate of the courts
has become closely tied to the fiscal and political well-being of
the state.  Courts are being forced to compete for funding
against more politically popular state services, such as educa-
tion and public safety, or against seemingly out of control
mandatory expenses, such as health care—often without much
success.  
It would be easy to chalk the current fiscal crisis in the
courts purely to state financing problems.  Yet the financial cri-
sis facing many state judiciaries is not simply a problem of cash
flow or reduced revenues, and to paint it as such puts a far too
simplistic spin on the matter.  To be sure, a significant part of
the crisis is rooted in economic factors.   But to understand the
true breadth of the problem, one must take account of the
political factors affecting state court budgets.  
The crisis is defined by considerations that reflect not only
money, but also the expanding influence of state judiciaries,
offsetting concerns in some circles with “judicial activism,”
and a seemingly growing and fundamental misunderstanding
regarding the status and role of the courts in governing the
nation.  
Donald L. Horowitz aptly described the current environ-
ment, which contrasts sharply with practices in England:
The difference in the scope of judicial power in
England and the United States should not be exagger-
ated.  It is primarily a difference of emphasis.  There
have been periods of great passivity in America.  But
still the difference remains. What it has meant, in the
main, is that American courts have been more open to
new challenges, more willing to take on new tasks.
This has encouraged others to push problems their
way—so much so that no courts anywhere have
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The Challenge of Funding State
Courts in Tough Fiscal Times
Michael L. Buenger
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly 
essential in a limited Constitution.  * * * *   Without this, all the reservations 
of particular rights of privileges would amount to nothing.1
We are looking at the dismantling of our court system; it is a very painful process.2
6. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1977).
7. Ronald K. Snell, Corina Eckl, & Graham Williams, State Spending
in the 1990s, National Conference of State Legislators (July 14,
2003), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/stspend90s
.htm (last visited October 4, 2004).
8. Id.  For example, overall Medicaid expenditures for Utah increased
from approximately $600 million in FY 1996 to almost $1.5 billion
in FY 2005. See State of Utah Budget Summary, FY 2005, available
at http://www.governor.state.ut.us/gopb/fy2005budgetsummary
.pdf (last visited October 4, 2004).
9. Under Ohio’s biennium FY2004 – FY2005 budget, education (ele-
mentary, secondary and higher), Medicaid, other health and
human services, public safety (not including judiciary), and tax
relief consume 96.7% of the general revenue fund. 
10. For example, in FY 1983 Missouri spent 1.8% of the state general
revenue fund on court operations.  In FY 2004, the state will
spend 1.65% of the general revenue fund on the judiciary,
notwithstanding an almost $120 million increase in the judi-
ciary’s budget over 20 years. 
11. See generally American Bar Ass’n, State Court Funding Crisis,
Selected State and Local Resources: Oregon, available at
http://www.abanet.org/jd/courtfunding/resources_statelocal3.htm
l#38 (last visited October 4, 2004). The Oregon Supreme Court
in response to drastic budget cuts closed all appellate, tax, and
circuit courts on Fridays from March 1 to June 30, 2003, and cut
staff hours by 10%.  In addition, in some areas of the state the
courts stopped hearing a wide range of cases including small
claims, nonperson misdemeanors, violations, probate, many civil
cases and non-person felony cases.
greater responsibility for making public policy than
the courts of the United States.6
Today, perhaps more so than at another time in the nation’s
history, the courts are involved in policy making on such a
broad range of matters that conflict with the other branches of
government is inevitable and can involve budgetary consider-
ations.   
A.  THE STATE FUNDING DILEMMA 
A state budget is, in the truest sense, a statement of public
policy more than a simple allocation of money for programs.
The creation of a state budget is a continuing exercise of bal-
ancing competing public demands filtered not through logical
legal principles, but through the eyes of national, regional,
state, and local politics.  It reflects shifting program priorities,
regional concerns, economic considerations, local desires, and
competing political philosophies.  As such, a state budget can
shift wildly from year to year, producing a “fits-and-starts”
approach to public policy development as evidenced by the
complete elimination of a program one year and its complete
resurrection the following year.  To mimic the historian Barbara
Tuchman, who once observed that history is formed by person-
ality, for good or ill a state budget is formed by those in power
to form it.  Thus, it reflects not only overarching policy consid-
erations but also the personal priorities of each legislator and
the governor.  It is important, therefore, to appreciate that
unlike a court case ensconced with procedures and restraints
that seek to objectify the decisional process, no such restraints
exist in the legislative process.  The construction of a state bud-
get is very much an exercise in personality, politics, and policy.  
Economically, the late 1990s saw an explosion in state rev-
enues with a corresponding explosion in state spending.
According to the National Conference of State Legislators, state
spending from 1991 to 2001 grew 88%, or an average of 6.57%
annually, largely in response to increased revenues.7 During
this time, Medicaid expenditures increased 149%, education
90%, corrections 99%, and other health and welfare costs 39%.8
There appeared to be little appreciation that the bubble would
eventually bust because the “new economy” had put an end to
inflation, deflation, and all other aspects of the economic cycle.  
Of course, that belief ended with shocking swiftness begin-
ning in late 2000.  State governments were faced with the
results of overextending state
budgets in the late 1990s and
shifting federal spending man-
dates.  Health care and educa-
tion costs, largely formula dri-
ven, were growing at a rate far
in excess of the ability of states
to generate the revenue to
cover them.  Tough sentencing
policies led to ever increasing
corrections costs in response to
the expanding inmate popula-
tion.  As result, today the five
largest functional areas of most
state budgets are generally education, Medicaid, corrections,
health and mental health, and social support programs, in
some cases consuming as much as 85% of a state budget.9
Much of the spending was mandated by the federal govern-
ment or the result of policy decisions given little long-term fis-
cal consideration when adopted. Consequently, states were left
with relatively little money to actually “run” the remainder of
state government, including the courts.  As the mandated
expenses continued to outpace revenue growth, budget writers
looked to the remainder of state government—generally
viewed as discretionary obligations—to fill the gaps, causing
further reductions in funding for “needed” but not “necessary”
programs. 
In Missouri, for example, the amount of money spent on the
judiciary as a percentage of overall state spending has
decreased over the last 20 years, notwithstanding an increase
in real dollars spent.10 The increase in real dollars generally
reflects a shift to state funding for programs and personnel his-
torically paid by the counties.  Little money has been made
available to underwrite new programs or expand existing pro-
grams.  From an economics perspective, this is important his-
tory because while some states faced declining revenues in the
2001-2003 period, the greater culprit was out-of-control
mandatory spending that far outpaced the ability (or willing-
ness) of state legislatures to generate needed money. 
The impact on the courts was noticeable.  In Oregon, one of
the most seriously hit of the states, the courts closed one day
per week, furloughed employees, and implemented a “delay
and no action” policy on processing certain types of cases.11
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12. See generally American Bar Ass’n, State Court Funding Crisis,
Selected State and Local Resources: California, available at
http://www.abanet.org/jd/courtfunding/resources_statelocal3.htm
l#38 (last visited October 4, 2004).  See also State Budget Woes Hit
Courts Hard, April 2003 CALIF. B. J. at 1.
13. Budget Cuts Could Delay Court Cases, COLUMBIA (MO.) DAILY
TRIBUNE, April 22, 2003.
14. Florida Not Alone in Funding Woes, TALLAHASSEE (FLA.) DEMOCRAT,
April 30, 2003.  See also New Hampshire Bar Ass’n,  State Budget
Plan to Further Cut Court Services  (May 2, 2003).  In Alabama,
jury trials were temporarily suspended in 2002 due to lack of
funds, although emergency funds were made available to resume
trials. In Massachusetts, the judicial branch experienced a $40
million deficit in 2002, with additional cuts anticipated in 2003.
The courts have lost over 1,000 employees through attrition and
layoffs. In Kansas, budget cuts forced the Supreme Court to take
the unusual step under its inherent authority of imposing a $5
emergency surcharge on all case filings.  See American Bar Ass’n,
Summary of Issues and ABA Policies, State Court Funding Crisis
at http://www.abanet.org/jd/courtfunding/issues. html (last vis-
ited October 4, 2004). 
15. For example, over 70% of Missouri’s state judicial budget is for
funding personnel in the circuit courts.  Less than 10% of the
overall budget is dedicated to operations.
16. For example, in Commissioners v. Hall, 7 Watts 290, 291 (Pa.
1838), a Pennsylvania court held, “When a deficiency of public
accommodation induces an expenditure, it must be at the public
charge, for it is as much a part of the contingent expenses of the
court, as is the price of the fire wood and candles consumed in the
court room.” See also County Comm’rs of Allegany Co. v. County
Comm’rs of Howard Co., 57 Md. 393 (1882) (county from which
prisoner came is required to pay costs related to the jury);  Stowell
v. Jackson Co. Sup’rs., 57 Mich. 31, 34 (1885) (in criminal cases
the power of the court to keep prisoner in custody binds the
county to pay for the maintenance); Carpenter v. County of Dane,
9 Wis. 274 (1859) (in meritorious cases court has obligation to
appoint counsel and county has obligation to pay). 
California faced cutting almost
$200 million from its judiciary
budget, forcing early retirements,
reducing full-time jobs to three-
quarter time, limiting night
court, and closing courtrooms.12
Missouri faced a possible 15%
across-the-board reduction that
would have closed courthouses
and eliminated as many as one in
every four non-statutory
employees.13 And Florida’s chief
justice spoke of drastic cuts in court personnel and operations,
and called upon the state bar to lobby the legislature on behalf
of adequate funding for the judiciary.14
The problem with managing judicial budgets during this
period was exacerbated by the fact that so much of a state’s
courts budget is heavily laden with personnel costs.  With a
few exceptions, most states split court funding obligations
between state and county governments, with the former cov-
ering the bulk of personnel costs and the latter covering the
bulk of operational costs.  What this has meant in the main is
that cuts to state judicial budgets frequently result in staff
reductions, particularly at the trial court level, which tends to
be the bulk of the budget.15 Adding to the difficulty is that a
significant dollar portion of the personnel costs in a state’s
courts budget are judicial and other statutory salaries not sub-
ject to reduction. Thus, where a 5% across-the-board reduction
in an executive department’s budget may be absorbed through
operational restructuring or pro-rata staff reductions, a like cut
to the judiciary’s budget can result in significant staff reduc-
tions.  
In an effort to create revenue without raising taxes, state
legislatures turned to court cases as fee-generation tools.
Groups impacted by the budget crisis likewise lobbied state
legislatures to impose new fees on court cases to fund particu-
lar and special programs—many of which have nothing to do
with the administration of justice much less underwriting the
costs of the courts. During the 2004 legislative session, for
example, the Missouri General Assembly introduced bills that
would have increased court fees to fund a law enforcement
officers’ annuity, promote child advocacy centers, institute
gang resistance education, underwrite sheriffs’ prisoner costs,
and expand DNA laboratories.  Although not all of these fees
passed, the aggregate increase could have added as much as
$50 to certain court cases.  
The confluence of these economic factors forces a singularly
important question: How does the state judiciary (at all levels)
maintain access to the courts and its decisional independence
when its evolving institutional independence is now so tied to
resources that are in competition with the politics and spend-
ing priorities of the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment?  The spending cuts and fee increases for justice ser-
vices leave one wondering whether the judiciary and justice
system are no longer viewed as a general obligation of govern-
ment, but rather as just another fee-based operation, open pri-
marily to those who can afford the service.  
B.  A CHANGING PARADIGM?
Even before the current fiscal crisis, courts around the
nation struggled to obtain the resources needed to maintain
operations and underwrite the costs of ever-expanding pro-
grams.  Thus, funding problems for courts are not new.  As far
back as 1838, one court was forced to exercise inherent power
to compel the expenditure of funds for judicial operations
related to the case determination.16 The present crisis, there-
fore, simply underscores what many court officials have
known for years: funding of the judiciary has always been a
tenuous adventure.  In recent years, however, the number and
intensity of court funding disputes has seemingly increased,
forced by the dramatic increase in the judiciary’s responsibili-
ties, its exploding caseloads, the reach of its decisions, and the
costs associated with running large state judicial systems.
Unlike early funding disputes, today’s disputes center more on
the institutional needs of the judiciary rather than the
resources needed to resolve a particular case.  
For much of the nation’s history courts—be they federal or
state—enjoyed only limited institutional status or influence as
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17. During the Constitution Convention, for example, James
Madison appealed for the creation of a separate federal judiciary
arguing, “[I]n Rhode Island the Judges who refused to execute an
unconstitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by
the Legislatures who would be willing instruments of the wicked
and arbitrary plans of their masters.” RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787.  See also Notes of Rufus King in the Federal
Convention of 1787 (June 4, 1787) available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/king.htm#june4  (last
visited October 4, 2004). Thomas Jefferson complained that the
legislature’s assumption of executive and judicial powers ren-
dered no opposition to “173 despots” who “would surely be as
oppressive as one.” Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of
Virginia, Query XIII at 4 (1782), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffvir.htm  (last visited
October 4, 2004).
18. For example, there is no long jurisprudential history for housing
law, welfare law, environmental law, natural resource manage-
ment, school desegregation, or medical ethics.
a separate branch of government. The modern concept of the
judiciary’s institutional independence, which now embraces
broad, self-governing authority, is a relatively new development
resulting from a long, evolutionary process.17 This fact is exhib-
ited by the lack of any institutional structure provided by early
state constitutions or even the federal constitution.  In many
states, like the federal government, the institutional structure
and status of the courts was a function of the legislature, not a
direct product of a constitution.  This was particularly true
with regards to the internal management and governance of the
courts.  
This began changing in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury as state judiciaries emerged with a more robust institu-
tional identity.  At the state level, the evolving institutional
independence of the courts is evidenced in the language of
many “modern” judicial articles.  Unlike the federal
Constitution and many early state constitutions, which
anchored much of the judiciary’s institutional structure in the
legislature, modern state constitutions now generally place this
responsibility directly in the judiciary or in extra-legislative
bodies.  The revision of judicial articles over the last 50 years
illustrates the shift from relying on the legislature for the insti-
tutional structure and authority of courts toward anchoring
such matters directly in the constitution and the judiciary
itself.  For example, in many states, the legislature no long con-
trols such critical matters as creating trial courts, establishing
jurisdiction and venue, controlling the selection and removal of
judges, or even setting salaries. Arguably, over the last half-cen-
tury, the power of the legislature to control the fundamental
structure of courts has greatly diminished while the “institu-
tional” influence of the judiciary has grown, both constitution-
ally and socially.  The development of modern judicial institu-
tions and the evolving role of the judiciary in governing
American society provide ample opportunity for conflicts with
those holding more traditionally focused beliefs concerning the
role of courts.  
As a result of structural changes—not only in governance
but also in the growing influence of courts and the explosion of
programs directly under the judiciary’s control—state courts
have attained an institutional standing not previously enjoyed
or recognized by the coordinate branches of government. This
growing “institutionalizing” of the courts, combined with the
complexity and costs of running large judicial systems, have
arguably altered traditional relationships within the judiciary
and between the courts and the coordinate branches.  
The role of state courts is no long limited to adjudication.
Essential to the modern judiciary is providing a wide range of
services that result from the act
of judgment, but also sit apart
from that act at an operational
and budgetary level. Beginning
in the 1950s and accelerating
through the 1960s, courts have
been confronted with a wide
range of new legal remedies for
which little if any “judge
made” law has existed.18
Taken singularly, the actions of
courts in these areas represent
no great departure from the
traditional notion of judges
and courts deciding cases.
However, taken in their totality,
these emerging areas of specialty law have radically reshaped
the exercise of judicial power, the breadth of its application
beyond the confines of a single case, and have, arguably, com-
pelled a departure from more traditional judicial functions.
This has created a climate ripe for conflicts over the breadth
and limits of the judiciary’s institutional independence and its
funding needs. The centralization of authority and superin-
tending power in state supreme courts has complicated the
matter, in that a single controversial decision can impact the
entire judiciary’s state-funded budget, not just that of the court
issuing the decision. 
Thus, the current debate on judicial independence and
court funding has little to do with historical considerations
from the 18th century and more to do with the expanding role
of courts in governing American society today.  In short, it has
never been entirely clear where the divide lies between the
exercise of judicial power by independent courts and the
authority of the coordinate branches to both define and con-
tain that independence, through substantive law and bud-
getary manipulation. Rather, the divide has been a function of
ebb and flow, depending in large measure on the cultural and
political environment of the particular age in which the exer-
cise of such power took place.  The current age is no different,
though arguably more complicated given today’s pressing pub-
lic policy issues.  One cannot underestimate the significance of
fundamental differences on the emerging role of the courts as
a factor impacting the funding debate.
Additionally, while courts may see themselves as the weak-
est of the branches of government, others may tend to view
modern courts as possessing extraordinary power due in large
measure to the zero-sum nature of the judicial process.  Where
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19. The current standard in many states for the exercise of “inherent
power” to compel funding is “reasonably necessary.” See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Wilke, Judge v. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm’rs,
734 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 2000).
20. As observed in In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 163, 173
(Wash. 1976), “The judiciary is isolated from the opinion gather-
ing techniques of public hearings as well as removed from politi-
cally sensitive, proportionately elected representatives.”
21. Id. at 172.
22. Conference of State Court Administrators, State Judicial Branch
Budgets in Times of Fiscal Crisis, 19 COURT MANAGER 27, 28
(2004).
the political branches must
negotiate solutions through a
consensus building exercise
largely defined by democratic
principles, the judicial process
forces courts to render “final
judgments” in disputed cases;
in effect, to declare winners
and losers ostensibly without
the nuance of politics. 
The judicial process
inevitably leads to perceived
winners and losers.  The typi-
cal question before a judge is whether one party has a right and
the other party a duty, with the court generally rendering a
decision supported by predefined legal principles on disputed
issues of fact or law.   While one may contest this proposition,
arguing that court decisions are decidedly an exercise in bal-
ancing interests, the judicial process encourages—indeed
demands—that courts resolve disputes, including those impli-
cating public policy, on the narrowest of grounds and with a
much higher degree of finality than the legislative process
allows. By contrast, the typical questions confronting a legisla-
ture or executive bureaucracy are what is the better public pol-
icy and what are the full breadth of alternatives available to
resolve a problem. Narrow principles of legal analysis have lit-
tle value in this context. Thus, where Americans generally look
to the legislative process to protect broad public interests (a
function of negotiation and compromise), they generally look
to the judicial process to protect private interests (a function of
declaration and finality). These starkly different ways of defin-
ing and resolving public policy problems necessarily impact
the internal workings and cultures of three branches of gov-
ernment.  Individual court decisions with broad public impact,
consequently, can be seen as providing policy direction that is
out of touch with the political world and its underlying demo-
cratic values, not to mention overarching budgetary considera-
tions.  
C. IS THERE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE?
In difficult budget times, courts may be tempted to rest on
a belief that the legislature has an unbounded obligation to
provide the resources reasonably necessary for the efficient
administration of justice through the separate, coequal judicial
branch of government.  While it is true that the legislature has
an obligation to fund the courts at an appropriate level,19 prac-
tically achieving this goal is an entirely different matter. Courts
have no formal role in the budget process.  The idea of courts
“ordering” the expenditure of public funds for their own oper-
ations—as if rendering a final judgment—is at odds with the
give and take of the legislative process, whose primary actors
balance, sometimes inequitably, competing and amorphous
interests in shaping public policy through the budget.20
Therefore, while courts may be tempted to exercise inherent
powers to compel needed funding, the long-term consequences
to such an action can be significant. As the Washington
Supreme Court observed, “By its nature, litigation based on
inherent judicial power to finance its own functions ignores the
political allocation of available monetary resources by represen-
tatives of the people elected in a carefully monitored
process.”21 The unreasoned assertion of inherent power by the
judiciary to demand funding can be a threat to the image of and
public support for the courts. Such actions may threaten, rather
than strengthen, judicial independence, by conveying an image
of courts that comports more with political power plays and not
the exercise of reasoned judgment.  The legislature and other
groups whose interests are adversely affected by such court
action can legitimately respond with political sanctions, includ-
ing threats of impeachment, tighter control over judicial selec-
tion, and opposition to the individuals who initiate budgetary
intervention. The exercise of inherent power in the context of a
budget fight should always be viewed as a weapon of last resort.
Alternative, less drastic, and more permanent solutions to prob-
lems of court finance must be pursued.  
First and foremost, courts are public institutions and
should, therefore, see themselves as accountable to the public
for the use of its resources.  There has been a tendency in some
quarters to wrap judicial administration and funding in a man-
tle of independence that is more appropriately directed to insu-
lating individual judges and insulating individual judgment.
Without a doubt, the hallmark of the American justice system
has been the individual and impartial act of judgment—judg-
ment generally free from the influence of unwarranted politi-
cal coercion and intervention from the other branches of gov-
ernment.  Yet the individual independence that judges enjoy
cannot be a mechanism for holding the institution of the judi-
ciary unaccountable for its use of resources.  To the extent that
the institution strives to set itself apart from considerations for
accountability, it invites higher scrutiny and great intrusion.
“Credibility grows when judicial budget priorities are consis-
tent from year to year, when courts take steps to measure and
report on their management performance, when courts
demonstrate sound fiscal management over time, and when
the judiciary routinely demonstrates how individual courts
and programs have used resources wisely and in accordance
with sound fiscal practices.”22 In short, courts must see them-
selves as institutionally accountable to the public if they rea-
sonably expect to compete for scarce public dollars in an
increasingly competitive environment.
Second, there certainly has been serious erosion in the pub-
lic’s understanding of the role of courts, a lack of understand-
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23. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
describe courts as mere “agencies” of government or who per-
petuate disrespect for the judiciary only exacerbate difficult
funding decisions.  There is a need for the judiciary to become
more engaged in the education of the legislature and the citi-
zenry.  People fear what they do not understand and few peo-
ple understand the courts.  Courts play an active role in gov-
erning the nation, not simply resolving its disputes.  The pub-
lic needs to understand this role, and courts have an affirma-
tive obligation through appropriate outreach to increase this
understanding.
Finally, much as been made of finding alternative funding
mechanisms for the judiciary to wean its dependence on state
general revenues and provide greater insulation from potential
budgetary blackmail.  Such mechanisms should be discussed
and explored, whether they involve a dedicated tax base, per-
centage set-asides, or mandated spending levels.  In exploring
alternative funding mechanisms, however, courts must be
careful not to contribute to a “theme park” mentality whereby
both access to and funding of the courts becomes overly
dependent on fees.  James Madison once observed, “Justice is
the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has
been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until lib-
erty be lost in the pursuit.”23 As the “end of government,” the
justice system and the courts must be viewed as a general
obligation of government, indeed one of its most fundamental
obligations.  When legislatures and the courts themselves turn
to fee-based structures to replace general funding obligations,
the image of courts as a cornerstone of democratic government
is substantially eroded.  
Funding of the state judiciary has always been a tenuous
activity and is even more so today.   There are many and varied
reasons for the funding challenges state judiciaries face, some
of which are beyond the control of courts and some of which
are clearly the results of judicial action or inaction.  In today’s
world, courts must balance the interests of individual judg-
ment with institutional standing; in effect, to preserve a long
and fruitful heritage of individual and impartial judgment at a
time when institutional concerns are of growing importance.
It is important to appreciate that political complaints today
about the judiciary are not wrapped in the language of an indi-
vidual judge, but rather in language of “the courts.”  Only by
preserving the individual act of judgment within the emerging
institutional status of the judiciary can courts can preserve
their important role in governance. 
Michael L. Buenger is the state court adminis-
trator for the Missouri judicial branch.  He is
the immediate past president of the Conference
of State Court Administrators, an organization
comprised of the state court administrators of
all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands.  Buenger received his B.A. cum laude
from the University of Dayton in 1983; he also earned a J.D. cum
laude from the St. Louis University School of Law in 1989.
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